University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1998

Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom
Possible?
Steven D. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, Steven D., "Is a Coherent Theory of Religious Freedom Possible?" (1998). Constitutional Commentary. 1040.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1040

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

IS A COHERENT THEORY OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM POSSIBLE?
Steven D. Smith·
Is a theory of religious freedom possible? It's obvious that
we can and do talk about and argue about issues of religious
freedom-school prayer, aid to parochial schools, and so forth.
But a "theory" entails something more than "talk," or ad hoc
argumentation. 1 More specifically, we would treat talk as falling
short of being a "theory of religious freedom" on either of two
grounds that are relevant here.
First, we sometimes distinguish between a "theory" and
something else that we might describe as a compromise or
"modus vivendi." A modus vivendi doesn't give us an internally
consistent set of principles capable of generating answers to
questions of religious freedom; it is more in the nature of a negotiated, and perhaps messy, truce.
Second, a position does not qualify as a theory of religious
freedom if it begins by preferring one (or some subset) of the
competing religious and secular positions, and then proceeds to
spell out what that preferred position does and doesn't allow.
Suppose I contend, for example, that the law should permit
teacher-led school prayer but not compulsory baptism; and
when asked to explain these conclusions I argue that they follow
from the best interpretation of Catholic theology, or perhaps
Mormon or Muslim theology, and that this particular theology is
the truest or best one available. I think we do not consider this
sort of position to be a theory of religious freedom. On the contrary, this sort of position is as a historical matter entirely familiar, and it is just what religious freedom is supposed to save
us from.
• Byron White Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. Presented at the AALS Law & Religion panel, Washington D.C., January 6, 1997.
1. Thus, I don't think arguments that certain arrangements regarding religion are
better or worse than other arrangements necessarily implies that a theory of religious
freedom does or must exist, as some scholars suggest. See Christopher L. Eisgruber and
Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577, 591-92 (1996).
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I. WHY THERE CAN BE NO THEORY OF RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM
My view is that all argumentation about religious freedom
will be disqualified from being a "theory of religious freedom"
on one or the other of these grounds. 2 It may be helpful if I give
the reason for my view in summary form, and then elaborate.
I think the establishment and free exercise controversies
that we are familiar with present one aspect of a more universal
problem, which we might call the problem of "the spiritual and
the temporal. "3 "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the
Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the
other .... "4 The enduring problem is to determine how these
matters stand in relation to each other. Does the spiritual take
priority over the temporal, or vice versa? Is the spiritual more
real, or more authoritative, than the temporal-earth being
merely a footstool for heaven? Or, conversely, is the spiritual
merely derivative, or epiphenomenal, or perhaps merely a delusion?
Problems of religious freedom present one manifestation of
this conflict within the realm of politics and law. These problems may involve competing claims to authority advanced by
spiritual and temporal institutions. Or they may involve spiritual claims made by individuals that conflict with more general
temporal interests. And when such spiritual-temporal conflicts
arise, possible responses or resolutions can be understood as
falling into three general categories, which I will describe as
"spiritual primacy," "temporal primacy," and "dualism." The
first two categories offer the possibility (at least in the abstract)
of "theory," or of principled resolutions of conflicts-but not of
resolutions that can usefully be described as respecting
"religious freedom." The last category-dualism-is capable of
recognizing a place for religious freedom, but it does not offer
the possibility of principled resolutions of conflicts.

2. For a lengthier and somewhat differently structured argument for this conclusion, and one that considers "originalist" as well as "nonoriginalist" arguments, see Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious
Freedom (Oxford U. Press, 1995).
3. Different people would use different vocabularies, of course; they might distinguish between the soul with its goods and the body with its appetites, or between nature
and grace, or between our welfare in this life and in the next.
4. Galatians 5:17.
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A. THE PRIMACY OF THE SPIRITUAL

I want to try to clarify these general observations by considering a concrete example of each of these responses. So let
me start with the category of "spiritual primacy." In this view,
the temporal is subordinate to, or perhaps a subset of, the spiritual. And it seems to follow that spiritual-temporal conflicts
should be resolved by applying spiritual criteria.
As an example of this approach, consider the medieval papacy's conception of government and law, as interpreted by
Walter Ullmann. 5 Ullmann explains that
the papacy, in common with medieval doctrine and literature,
held that the individual's activities cannot be separated into
more or less well defined categories.... Christianity seized
the whole of man- man was whole and indivisible: every one
of his actions was thought to have been accessible to the
6
judgement by Christian norms and standards.

Those Christian norms and standards were ultimately directed toward a spiritual and indeed otherwordly end: the salvation of the soul. But it did not follow that the affairs of this life
were unimportant. On the contrary, "while the end of this
[Christian] society and of its members was in the other world,
the terrestrial life was nonetheless of fundamental importance in
achieving this other-worldly aim, that is, salvation. The principle of indivisibility embraced the life in this as well as in the
other world .... "7
Within this spiritual conception of life, the Church was responsible for administering the Christian norms that governed
all earthly activities. 8 Consequently, the papacy regarded the
5. I should say that although Ullmann's depiction, like all historical interpretations, is debatable; I'm using it here not so much to make historical claims as to illustrate
one possible approach to our problem.
6. Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages 33
(Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961).
7. ld. at 34.
However much a thing may be purely "temporal" it nevertheless had to serve a
Christian end, because in papal doctrine the "temporal" had no indigenous
value, had no autonomous standing, but was simply a means to an end .... The
"temporal" ... had no value in itself but assumed value if it was harnessed to
the purpose and end of the Christian's life and consequently of Christian society.
Id. at 73.
8. Precisely because this Church was an entity that existed on this earth its
direction concerned therefore the doings of its members on this earth. The vital point was that these earthly activities of the Christians must be directed by
Christian norms, which meant that they must be guided, orientated, directed.
Id. at 35.
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Church and the pope as possessing jurisdiction to direct all the
affairs of Christendom. Within this comprehensive jurisdiction,
Ullmann argues, all other authorities (including both bishops
and princes) were subordinate to papal authority. "Power, that
is, jurisdiction, was concentrated in the pope, who handed part
of it on to the bishops, part of it to kings and emperors, and so
9
forth." In sum, "the secular prince ... [was] a necessary, auxiliary organ ... instituted by divinity to assist the pope in his government."10
This conception provided an intellectual framework within
which conflicts between religious and secular authorities could
be adjudicated. 11 To use our terms, that framework allowed for
a "theory," I think, because it contained inclusive principles that
were accepted by the competing interests as those interests were
understood at the time. Of course, kings and emperors often resisted the popes' claims, and in the realm of power and politics
their resistance was often successful. But in the realm of theory
the secular rulers were severely handicapped because they
themselves embraced the inclusive premises on which the papal
claims rested.
Thus, Ullmann explains that "it would be wholly erroneous
to think that these principles were, so to speak, imposed upon
kings and princes." 1
No king or emperor ever objected to the papal theme that his
kingdom was entrusted to him by God: on the contrary, it was
the kings themselves who, quite independent of, and uninflu13
enced by, the papacy had adopted this standpoint.

Of course, a king could claim that he received his power
from God directly, rather through the intermediary of the pope.
The emperor Henry IV made just this claim in his famous dispute with Pope Gregory VII. But in an officially Christian
world this assertion seemed weak. The New Testament re9. Id. at 55. In this allocation of powers, the specific function of the secular prince
was the suppression of evil, including heresy, by force. Id. at 64-66,79-82. It was for the
Church to judge what was evil-full authority or sovereignty lay only with the pope, id.
at 67, 72, fr7 -and for the prince to act upon and enforce that judgment.
10. Id. at 65.
11. It meant that each office-holder should fulfil the functions contained in his
office, and no more. The king should not interfere in the functions of the
bishop, because he was not created for this purpose; the archdeacon should not
meddle with matters pertaining to the sheriff, and so forth.
Id. at 67.
12. ld. at 88.
13. Id. at 61.

1998]

THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

77

corded Christ's conferral of power on Peter-and, by inference,
on his successors-but what evidence was there of any independent divine conferral of authority on the king or the emperor? And what special competence could a worldly and perhaps illiterate prince claim in matters of scripture and Christian
doctrine? Ullmann stresses that within the Christocentric
worldview, papal claims to sovereignty were perfectly logicalindeed, virtually irrefutable. We might put the point more generally: If the primacy of a spiritual position is accepted within a
community, then it is natural that the office or institution responsible for preserving and interpreting that spiritual position
should enjoy ultimate authority within the community.
Consequently, the possibility of a secular authority independent of the Church awaited the emergence of a dualistic
worldview in which the "temporal" was freed from its subordination to the "spiritual." Opponents of papal authority tried to
develop this position. Ullmann explains: "What the dualists
aimed at in their opposition to the papacy was the ascription of
autonomous and indigenous character to the 'temporal' .... In
this way it was believed that the monarchy of the king could be
saved: in temporal matters the king was to be the monarch, in
spiritual matters the pope." 14
This dualist talk begins to sound familiar to modem ears
accustomed to the theme of "separation of church and state."
But in the medieval climate of opinion the dualist view made little headway for the understandable reason that the spiritual and
the temporal did not seem severable. Dualism, Ullmann explains, "contradicted not only the Pauline doctrine, which the
papacy had made its own, but also the principle of totality or indivisibility, which in itself was the message of Christianity, seizing as it did the whole of man and the whole of his activities
without splitting them up into different compartments. " 15
In sum, in a world in which competing parties concurred in
accepting a set of premises that treated the temporal as subordinate to the spiritual, it was possible to develop a theory regulating the relations between, to use our terms, church and state.
And this theory could contemplate-indeed, insist upon-a division of functions between "secular" officials such as kings and
religious officials such as bishops. Still, it would seem a little
14. Id. at 97. "[D]ualism of government was to be the panacea of royal governments from Henry IV in the Investiture Contest, who actually coined the term and invented the idea, down to the Reformers and beyond." Id.
15. Id.
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strange to describe this theory as a theory of religious freedom.
The label seems inappropriate not because the theory allowed
secular authorities no freedom-in fact the popes never tried to
dictate every decision made by kings and emperors-but because a system under which secular authorities are auxiliaries to
the Church and have just as much power as the Church assigns
to them is not the sort of arrangement we have in mind when we
talk about "religious freedom." On the contrary, we would call
such a system a "theocracy." And we are accustomed to treating "theocracy" not as a version of, but rather as the antithesis
of, "religious freedom."
B. THE PRIMACY OF THE TEMPORAL
I've been describing the medieval papacy's conception of
government, as depicted by Ullmann, as an example of a system
that gives priority to the spiritual. What might be an example of
the opposite position-that is, of a system that treats the spiritual as subordinate to or a subdivision of the temporal? You
might suspect that the answer is very close at hand-that as legal
scholars we actually inhabit just such a system. Maybe so, but to
avoid controversial characterizations, let me adopt the law
teacher's trick of describing a partly hypothetical culture that
will illustrate my point-one that you can recognize or not as
you choose.
Imagine then a community in which most people ultimately
believe in and care only for the temporal. They believe, perhaps, that this life is all we have: "When we die, we die." This
community also believes that there is no guiding intelligence or
overall purpose or design in the cosmos. So the purpose of people-and hence of governments established of, by, and for the
people-is to promote the welfare of human beings in this life.
The community and most of its members are committed solely
to the pursuit of temporal values and interests. Of course, this
community might still care about "spiritual" things in a watered
down sense of the word-it might use the adjective to describe
things like opera and poetry, for example-but it has rejected
religious entities or notions such as God, the soul, grace, the supernatural, and life after death.
But lest we solve the problem of religious freedom too
quickly simply by eliminating religion, we can suppose that a residual commitment to the spiritual lingers on in several ways.
First, a few members of the community retain a genuine faith in
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God, the soul, life after death, and the divine authorship of
scripture. These religious believers are widely regarded as peculiar and backward, and at least among the more educated,16
their faith is viewed as "irrational superstitious nonsense. "
Even so, they are capable of causing unpleasantness. Moreover,
in view of the community's egalitarian pretensions these religionists are thought to be entitled in some ill-defined sense to
"equal concern and respect."
In addition, some members of the community who do not
actually believe in God or the soul still feel a degree of selective
affection toward religious practices and traditions. They may
think some traditions are useful in the upbringing of children.
They expect that as adults these erstwhile children will come to
understand the purely pragmatic function of the traditionswhile of course continuing to pass on the traditions to their own
children.
Others may find religious practices soothing
(Gregorian chants, maybe), or aesthetically attractive, or useful
on special occasions for expressing emotions like hope or grief.
There are also agnostics of an antiquarian bent who find that religious traditions and rituals help them to preserve ties to the
past, and perhaps to maintain a sense of personal or communal
identity.
In short, "religion" continues to exist in various senses even
in this devoutly temporal community. But would there be any
room, or any reason, to give special honor or legal status to religious freedom? Of course, the community might recognize
and in a sense respect practices that for some purposes are classified under the heading of "religion." The community might
protect these practices, that is, because they implicate temporal
interests. If government interferes with religious belief or exercise, the interference might injure people's peace of mind or
sense of identity. Frustrated religionists might become uncivil
or even violent. For reasons like these, the community might
conceivably carve out an area of human activity called
"religion" and afford it different or special legal treatment. And
it's even conceivable, if unlikely, that this special treatment
could be successfully codified in terms of some principle or theory. People who advocated such a position might claim that
they had articulated a theory of religious freedom.
16. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1418, 1427 (1989)
(asserting that "such things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious nonsense").
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Still, there are good reasons to question both this possibility
and this characterization. Notice first that although the hypothetical position could be called a "theory of religious freedom,"
it does not offer any protection to religion as religion, or because
of its character as religion. Rather, the theory protects religion
as temporal human activity and because that activity is thought
to affect temporal interests. To put the point differently, from
the community's standpoint, it is in a sense merely fortuitous that
the activities and beliefs which affect the temporal interests in
question happen to be religious activities and beliefs. So we
might doubt that it is helpful, or accurate, to attach the label of
"theory of religious freedom" to an account that does not even
count the religious character of a belief or activity as relevant in
itself or for its own sake.
This question about truth-in-labeling points to a related
practical objection: The temporal interests invoked by the theory will probably not correlate cleanly with "religious" activities
and beliefs, and so it will seem both illogical and imprudent to
make the theory's application coextensive with what is for other
purposes called "religion." Suppose, for example, that a theory
is based on the value of self-realization. It holds, perhaps, that
government should not interfere in religious choices because
these choices are too closely linked to a person's sense of who
she is, or to her very identity; and self-definition or selfrealization are temporal interests that the community should respect.17 The point about labeling suggests that it would be more
accurate to call this a "theory of self-realization," not a "theory
of religious freedom." The related practical point is that selfrealization probably does not correlate precisely, or even very
closely, with religion. For many people, choices that are not religious may be central to self-realization, while choices that involve religion may not always affect self-realization in any essential way. So the logic of the theory suggests that it should
abandon its claim to being a theory of reli§ious freedom not
only in name but also in practical application.
17. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1113 (1988).
18. The draft exemption cases illustrate this progression. They started with statutory language that plainly exempted only persons whose objection to war arose from a
set of beliefs centered on faith in a "Supreme Being" -i.e. God. But in the modem climate of legal opinion this sort of focus seemed incongruous or unacceptable. Hence, the
cases first expanded the definition of what would count as a religious objection and then
made it clear that the expanded definition would apply even to a belief that the conscientious objector himself did not regard as a religious belief. Justice Harlan went even
further, explicitly asserting that the availability of the exemption could not depend on
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One response to this objection might argue that although
"religion" is not identical to temporal interests like personal
autonomy, still for practical purposes religion is a good proxy
for those interests. But this argument seems dubious at best.
Particularly in a pluralistic culture where "religion" takes a variety of radically diverse forms, it seems prima facie implausible
that the amorphous category of "religion" would correlate even
approximately with any particular temporal interest or set of interests.
In this situation, how would we account for continuing efforts to theorize about religious freedom? If a given community
already has a longstanding commitment to religious freedom derived from earlier events and other grounds (perhaps by now
largely forgotten), then it would be tempting to interpret temporal arguments for religious freedom as post hoc and less than
persuasive rationalizations for a commitment that the community has inherited but no longer fully grasps. And a prescription
that might naturally follow from this interpretation is that the
community should clean up its theory and practice in light of its
current beliefs and values. One way to do this would be to dissolve religious freedom into other, more current theories and
commitments-commitments to free speech/9 perhaps, or to
equality. 20
In this way the community conceivably might bring its practice into line with what is for it a plausible theory or set of principles. And under other headings, like "free speech" or
"equality," the community might continue to give legal protection to some beliefs and practices that the believers and practitioners themselves regard as "religion. "21 But the purified temporal community would not now claim to have, or to operate
according to, any "theory of religious freedom."

religion per se at all, but would have to be tailored to something else, such as a sincere
moral objection to war.
19. William Marshall is a prominent religion clause scholar who takes this course.
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 385 (1996); William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1983).
20. Leading constitutional scholars who take this approach include Lawrence
Sager and Christopher Eisgruber, see, e.g., Sager and Eisgruber, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577
(cited in note 1), and Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality, and Speech in
the U.S. Constitution, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 739 (1986).
21. I have discussed these "reductionist" approaches to religious freedom at
greater length in Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 196-223,239-40 (1991).
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C. DUALISM
The positions I've talked about thus far have been monistic
in the sense that they have regarded either the spiritual or the
temporal as primary and encompassing, with the subordinate
term being viewed as a subdivision of the primary or preferred
category. I have argued that at least in the abstract both perspectives offer the possibility of "theory" prescribing principled
resolutions for some of the disputes that we treat under the
headings of "religious freedom," or "church and state"; but neither perspective actually recognizes the value of "religious freedom" in a meaningful sense.
That value is associated, rather, with a dualist positionone that regards both the spiritual and the temporal as independently valuable. This sort of perspective, with both its
promises and problems, is reflected in John Locke's "A Letter
Concerning Toleration." Locke acknowledges the importance
both of spiritual interests-the salvation of the soul-and of
temporal or "civil interests," or "things belonging to this life,"
such as "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. "22 And spiritual and temporal values are independent of each other; property, for example, is a good not
because it will contribute to our eternal salvation, but because it
is valuable in the here and now.
Based on this dualistic view, Locke argues for a division of
responsibility between the church and the state. The church's
function is to care for the salvation of souls, and in such matters
of salvation the state has no legitimate concern. The state's
function, rather, is to protect and promote the civil interests. In
this way, Locke concludes that church and commonwealth are
"perfectly distinct, and infinitely different from each other" and
that '1t]he boundaries on both sides are fixed and immoveable."
Of course, dualistic thinking and imagery have pervaded
discussions of religious freedom in this country. The notion surfaces again and again: Church is church and state is state; they
are separated by a high and impregnable wall, and both are happier for the split. The dualist view is attractive because it seems

22. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in John Locke on Politics and
Education 21,25 (Classics Club, 1947).
23. Id. at 35.
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to recognize the value of religious freedom in a more meaningful sense than do either of the more monistic views.
In addition, presentations like Locke's even seem at first to
allow for a theory of religious freedom. The task of theory is to
determine which interests belong to the spiritual domain and
which belong to the temporal, and in this way to draw a line of
demarcation between the spheres. Once that line has been
fixed, then when questions of religious freedom arise we need
only examine the interests closely to see which side of the line
they fall on.
Upon closer examination, though, the pleasant prospects
offered by the dualist view dissolve. One way to consider the
problem is to ask from whose perspective it can be said that the
church's concern is solely for the salvation of souls, while the
state's responsibility is for this-worldly, "civil" interests. If this
is the way the church itself and the state itself understand their
respective domains, then a nice harmony of interests seems possible. Indeed, it becomes difficult to explain why religious freedom and church-state relations ever created such a ruckus in the
first place. On the other hand, if the church or the state do not
understand their roles in this way, so that Locke's description of
roles is merely his own (or perhaps the state's, or the church's)
view of what the division of responsibilities ought to be, then no
principled resolution has been achieved. Instead, the pretense
of such a resolution is in reality merely the imposition of terms
by a dominant party employing a deceitful description of what
the other party cares about.
In fact, churches historically have not understood their concern to be limited to the salvation of souls in the next life.24
Later in his essay, Locke acknowledges that both religion and
the state are vitally concerned with issues of morality. 25 The
concession effectively negates his earlier claim that the spiritual
and temporal spheres are "perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other" -a claim which is essential to the possibility of a dualistic or separation principle.
A different way of highlighting the false promise of dualism
is to ask whether the different interests of the spiritual and the
24. For example, many churches have regarded the achievement of education, so·
justice, and civil rights as major religious objectives. Even more importantly, relig·
Ions rarely separate the concerns of this life from those of the next; they have typically
taught that the way a person lives here will powerfully affect the disposition of the soul
after death.
25. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration at 52·53 (cited in note 22).
~ial
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temporal are wholly different, or whether their respective
spheres of interest are different but overlapping, as in a Venn
diagram. If the spheres of interest were wholly different, then a
principled resolution of conflicts should be easily attainable; indeed, the harder problem once again would be to explain why
such conflicts ever arise in the first place. But if the spheres
overlap (as they almost certainly do), then it is natural to suppose that conflicts, and hence questions of religious freedom,
will arise within the area of overlap. And within that area, the
dualist promise of a principled resolution cannot be fulfilled.
Since both the spiritual and the temporal make a claim, any solution will necessarily reject one of those claims by giving primacy to the competing perspective.
And precisely because it recognizes that the spiritual and
the temporal are both valuable, and that they are independently
valuable (as opposed to one being derived from or a subset of
the other), dualism cannot dictate which perspective should prevail. If the spiritual and the temporal are both real and autonomous, in other words, then there is no more encompassing principle to which they are both subordinate.
Any actual controversy involving religious freedom can
serve to illustrate this controversy. Suppose that Native Americans assert a religious duty to use peyote in religious rituals,
while a state insists on banning the use of harmful drugs, which
in the state's view include peyote. The use of peyote in this context affects both a spiritual interest and a temporal interest. A
dualist view would observe that both interests are independently
valuable; neither is simply derivative of or reducible into the
other. And the response to this dualist observation is, "Yes.
That's exactly why we have a conflict." In this context the spiritual and temporal domains overlap, and in order to resolve the
conflict, someone will have to treat either the spiritual or the
temporal as primary and the other interest as subordinate.
This objection does not imply that the dualist view is wrong,
I think, or that the dualist view cannot value religious freedom.
The point is merely that dualism itself cannot provide any the26
ory or principle defining the proper scope of religious freedom.
On the contrary, the occurrence of actual controversies demonstrates that a point has been reached where the contribution of
26. Does the absence of a "principle" mean that judicial review in this area would
necessarily be "unprincipled" and therefore illegitimate? For a tentative discussion, see
Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 497
(1996).
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dualism is insufficient to produce peace. At that point a decision-maker will be forced to give priority to either the spiritual
or the temporal perspective, and we will once again be faced
with the same problems that afflict the monistic positions.
II. THE INNUMERABLE CITIES
The moral of this story is that our concept of religious freedom gets its meaning within a dualist framework. But a dualist
framework cannot honestly offer any useful principle, or support
any theory, for adjudicating the problems we consider under the
heading of religious freedom. So to the extent that religious
freedom flourishes within a dualist system, it will necessarily reflect an accommodation or a modus vivendi among spiritual or
temporal interests, not a deduction from theory or principle.
This conclusion should not be surprising. On a personal
level, most of us are quite accustomed to negotiating between
the spiritual and the temporal. True saints (if there are any) or
true atheists (if there are any) may manage to achieve monistic
peace. Meanwhile, most of us try to serve both masters, and so
we live in tension, making choices that are at times arbitrary, intuitive, ad hoc, not regulated by any encompassing principle or
theory. We might say that we "balance" the spiritual and the
temporal, except that the metaphor of balancing suggests more
precision than we really experience. It might be more accurate
to say that we "juggle" the spiritual and the temporal, acknowledging that many of us are clumsy jugglers who are often forced
to stoop and pick up the pieces. As we've been told, the
"double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." 27
On a more global level, the moral of the discussion is also a
familiar one-famously presented in, for example, Augustine's
City of God. Religious believers are citizens of two cities,
Augustine explained-an earthly city and a heavenly one. Both
cities seek "peace." This apparently common goal might make
it seem that the cities are nicely harmonious; and indeed a limited harmony may be achievable. 28 But in fact by "peace" the
two cities understand quite different things. "The earthly city,
which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end
it proposes ... is the combination of men's wills to attain the
27. James 1:8.
28. "[A)s this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in
regard to what belongs to it." Saint Augustine, City of God 19:17 (Marcus Dods, trans.
& ed., Hafner Publishing Co., 1948).
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things which are helpful to this life." 29 The heavenly city takes
advantage of this peace, but it also understands that "the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one
another in God" is what "alone can be truly called and esteemed
the peace of the reasonable creatures .... " 30 These different
conceptions and different ultimate attachments and aspirations
sometimes come into conflict, and when that happens "the
heavenly city has been compelled ... to dissent, and to become
obnoxious to those who think differently." 31
In the final analysis, therefore, the heavenly city "lives like
a captive and a stranger in the earthly city." 32 The heavenly city
can seek benign terms of captivity, or perhaps a sort of truce,
from the earthly sovereign; it cannot hope for genuine understanding and union.
Augustine's analysis remains valid for our modern society, I
think, except that our more developed pluralism-in the realms
both of religion and of government-may make the description
of two cities seem a little quaint. For us, it seems, there are not
two but rather many cities-many conflicting faiths, worldviews,
lifestyles, cultural and political allegiances. This riotous pluralism merely underscores the conclusion suggested above: We
may aspire to achieve a modus vivendi among these competing
positions, but it is a mistake to suppose that there can be any encompassing theory or "neutral principle" to regulate their interaction.

29.
30.
31.

32.

ld. (emphasis added).
ld.
Id.
ld.

